Making Contact with Observations by Votsis, Ioannis
 1 
Making Contact with Observations 
Ioannis Votsis 
University of Duesseldorf  
1. Introduction 
Prajit K. Basu (2003) argues that for observations to be of use in theory testing, they first need 
to be transformed into evidence. Since the transformation, according to him, involves the 
introduction of theoretical vocabulary, the end-product is theory-laden.1 Basu motivates his 
claims using a distinction between raw (observational) data and evidence, adapted from 
Bogen and Woodward’s influential distinction between data and phenomena.2 Following 
Bogen and Woodward, he claims that theories do not entail, predict or explain observation 
statements or data, not even with the help of suitable theoretical auxiliaries. This prevents any 
direct observational assessment of theories (plus auxiliaries).3 My aim in this paper is to 
contest the claim that theories accompanied by suitable theoretical auxiliaries cannot be 
                                                 
1
 Basu states: “A piece of evidence is then expressed by a sentence in the language, LT, of the theory. It is in this 
sense that a piece of evidence is theory laden” (p. 358). 
2
 According to Bogen and Woodward, data are observable whereas (physical) phenomena are unobservable. 
Theories only talk about the latter. As they stress, “…data typically cannot be predicted or systematically 
explained by theory” (1988, pp. 305-306). Although Basu agrees with much of what Bogen and Woodward have 
to say, he thinks that their distinction “is inadequate in handling cases of ‘revolutions’ in science” (p. 354). 
3
 Observations, Basu claims, need not be theory-laden but they cannot play a direct role in confirmation: 
“…although one could legitimately hold that there are observations that are not theory infected, such 
observations cannot be employed for theory resolution” (2003, p. 356) [my emphasis]. Confusingly, his 
conception of ‘non-theory laden’ observations is anything but ‘non-theory laden’, as he takes them to be those 
that scientists can merely agree on. He says: “Observations understood as (raw) data are trivially theory-laden. 
But in a more interesting sense, they may not be. This is because the consensus within the scientific community 
about what observations (or raw data) are, does not emphasize the ineliminably theoretical aspect these 
observations have. This consensus is historically contingent” (p. 364). 
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directly tested via observations. In so doing, I will utilise Basu’s own case study, a rather 
well-known controversy between Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Priestly. 
 
The Lavoisier-Priestly controversy concerns two conflicting results emanating from what 
appear to be the same experiments independently carried out by the two scientists. Both 
scientists were in agreement that the observable result of the experiments was the production 
of a black powder with certain properties.4 Since their respective theories of oxygen and of 
phlogiston do not speak of (or indeed entail) the presence of black powder, the observable 
result cannot immediately be used for theory adjudication. The raw observational data first 
has to be theoretically treated. This is where the disagreement arose. For Priestly, who 
advocated the phlogiston theory, when iron is heated in dephlogisticated air it leads to the 
production of iron calx. For Lavoisier, an advocate of the oxygen theory, the heating of iron in 
oxygen leads to the production of iron oxide. Yet, the presence of iron calx is only entailed by 
the phlogiston theory and the presence of iron oxide is only entailed by the oxygen theory. In 
other words, the same observation (i.e. the presence of a particular kind of black powder) is 
theoretically interpreted – out of necessity, for on its own, Basu claims, it is not evidentially 
potent – as two different evidential statements, each only confirming its respective theory.  
 
Although Basu takes theoretical auxiliaries as necessary for the transformation of 
observations into evidence, he insists that they cannot help infer the relevant observation 
statements from the given theory. In the case at hand, this means that the presence of that 
particular kind of black powder cannot be inferred from either of the two theories. To see this 
                                                 
4
 Priestly and Lavoisier agreed on various other observable results such as balance readings. They disagreed on 
whether the reaction only led to the production of black powder, namely Priestly thought that carbon dioxide was 
also produced. This disagreement is not important for our current discussion - Basu similarly sidelines it - as we 
are only interested in the inferences that take us from (commonly shared) observations to evidence. 
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point, let’s formalise the aforementioned statements. Let O1: Iron is heated in oxygen, O2: 
Iron is heated in dephlogisticated air, E1: Iron oxide is produced, E2: Iron calx is produced, B: 
Black powder with certain observable properties is present, L: O1 → E1, P: O2 → E2, A1: B → 
E1 and A2: B → E2. The relevant statement in Lavoisier’s theory is L and the one in Priestly’s 
theory is P. A1 and A2 are theoretical auxiliaries that respectively allow each scientist to go 
from observation to evidence.5 Let’s take Lavoisier’s theory first. From O1 and L, we can 
infer E1 but not B. To confirm Lavoisier’s theory we must assume A1 which together with B 
entail E1. Thus, to confirm Lavoisier’s theory (or at least one of its parts, i.e. L), we must first 
transform B into an evidentially relevant statement (i.e. E1) using theoretical auxiliary A1. 
Notice that if we add A1 to the set of statements {O1, L} we still cannot infer B. This seems to 
vindicate Basu’s point that even with the help of theoretical auxiliaries we cannot infer the 
observational statement. In his own words, “…the construction of E1 in (1) [i.e. the 
proposition that B and A1 imply E1] is asymmetrical. The fact that iron oxide is produced does 
not entail (along with [A1]) that a black powder is produced” (p. 361).6 The same can be said 
of Priestly’s theory. From O2 and P, we can infer E2 but not B. To confirm Priestly’s theory 
we must assume A2 which together with B entail E2. Thus, to confirm Priestly’s theory (or at 
least one of its parts, i.e. P), we must first transform B into an evidentially relevant statement 
(i.e. E2) using theoretical auxiliary A2. Again, notice that if we add A2 to the set of statements 
{O2, P} we cannot infer B. Finally, it is worth mentioning that we cannot judge Priestly’s 
theory on E1 and Lavoisier’s theory on E2. Each evidential statement is at best irrelevant to the 
other theory, at worst disconfirms it. 
 
                                                 
5
 The auxiliaries are conjunctions of various theses. Both A1 and A2 include the Stahlian theses, as Basu suggests 
(p. 361).  
6
 Basu uses different letters to denote the auxiliaries. 
 4 
Basu ponders at one point “whether it is possible to predict the (raw) data from the hypothesis 
by employing suitable auxiliary assumptions” (p. 362). He effectively dismisses this 
possibility. In a footnote he says: “In fact, there are indefinite number of such assumptions 
that need to be specified… that seems to be a hard, if not impossible task” (p. 363, 35f) [my 
emphasis]. Indeed, he thinks that “(raw) data never have any evidential bearing” (p. 364) [my 
emphasis]. In what follows, I contest the claim that it is hard to find suitable auxiliary 
assumptions that let us derive, predict and potentially explain observational reports like B. 
 
2. Partitioning Properties 
Sets can be partitioned into various disjoint parts. More formally we say that a set P is a 
partition of a set S if and only if (1) all of P’s members are non-empty subsets of S, (2) the 
union of P’s members is co-extensional to S and (3) the intersection of any two members of P 
is empty.7 A peculiar aspect of this standard definition is that any set S (that can be 
partitioned) will have {S} among its partitions.8 For those interested in splitting the original 
set into two or more disjoint parts, a partition containing the original set as a member will of 
course be unwanted. To overcome this problem, let’s define another notion that prohibits such 
partitions, call it ‘partition*’. A set P is a partition* of a set S if and only if P fulfils the above 
three conditions (i.e. it is a partition of S) and P does not contain S as a member.9 Let’s denote 
                                                 
7
 An alternative first condition does not exclude non-empty subsets of S, thereby allowing for partitions such as 
{S, ∅}. 
8
 This means that even a singleton set has a partition – in fact it has only one partition. For example set {1} has 
one and only one partition, namely {{1}}. 
9
 Alternatively we may modify the first condition so that it reads ‘all of P’s members are non-empty proper 
subsets of S’. 
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such a set as Part*(S). Sets with less than two members cannot be partitioned*. For a set S 
with n members, the number of partitions* is given by the bell number of that set minus one.10  
 
Let us now move from propositional to predicate logic.11 Predicates denote properties. 
Extensionally understood, properties are sets. That means that for any set there is one and 
only corresponding (natural or artificial) property, and vice-versa. This allows us to partition* 
properties by partitioning* their corresponding sets. Thus a partition* of a set S will have as 
members non-empty non-intersecting sets, each of which can be assigned a different property. 
Indeed, any property applicable to more than one object can be partitioned* into two or more 
properties each of which is distinct from one another and applicable to at least one object. 
Take the property of being a mammal. It can be partitioned* into a great number of properties, 
some of them corresponding to natural, others to artificial properties. Examples of 
(presumably) natural properties are the properties of primate, rodent, bat and dolphin. 
Examples of artificial properties are the properties of being half a meter long, being named 
‘Alexa’ and weighing more than 500kg.12 
 
To remove any lingering unclarity, let us take a closer look at an example of a set being 
partitioned*. Suppose S = {1, 2, 3}. We know that this set has four partitions*, i.e. Part1*(S) = 
                                                 
10
 The bell number of a set is the number of that set’s partitions. For n=1, 2, 3,… the corresponding bell numbers 
are 1, 2, 5, 15, 52, 203,... Since partition* excludes S itself as a legitimate ‘partition’, the number of partitions* 
of a set S is given by the bell number of that set minus one. That means for n=1, 2, 3,… the corresponding 
numbers of partitions* are 0, 1, 4, 14, 51, 202, … 
11
 The material presented in the previous section was presented in propositional form for expediency. 
12
 Overlapping properties such as being half a meter long and being named ‘Alexa’ do not of course belong to 
the same partitions* of the property mammals. Note also that these particular properties are not contained whole 
in the property of being a mammal since there are non-mammals that instantiate them, i.e. strictly speaking they 
should be formulated as ‘being a mammal half a meter long” and “being a mammal named ‘Alexa’ ”. 
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{ {1}, {2}, {3} }, Part2*(S) ={ {1, 2}, {3}}, Part3*(S) ={ {1, 3}, {2}}, Part4*(S) ={ {2, 3}, 
{1}}. Observe that each partition* contains as members sets that are mutually disjoint and 
whose union is set S. Qua sets, each member of a partition* of S can be assigned a property. 
Take for example Part*1(S). It contains three members, namely sets {1}, {2}, {3}. Each of 
these can be assigned a different property; we can use the predicates R1, R2 and R3 to denote 
these properties. Now if R is the predicate denoting the property corresponding to set S, then 
(x) (Rx ≡ (R1x v R2x v R3x)). All the partitions* of S can be given the same treatment. This is 
so, as the properties on the right side of the biconditional are jointly co-extensional to the 
property on the left side. 
 
With these tools and results in mind, let us turn to the problem at hand. Given our move to 
predicate logic, atomic propositions O1, O2, E1, E2 and B are now taken to be predicates while 
complex propositions L, P, A1 and A2 are now quantified propositions. For example, 
theoretical auxiliary A1 now reads: (x) (Bx → E1x). Crucially, this universal generalisation 
implies that either E1 is co-extensional to B or B is a non-empty proper subset of E1.13 In the 
former case, this amounts to the bi-conditional statement A3: (x) (Bx ≡ E1x). If we add A3 as 
an auxiliary to our original set of propositions {O1a, L: (x) (O1x → E1x)} we can derive the 
desired sentence Ba, where a is the particular object that bears these properties. In the latter 
case, we can turn to the concept of partition* to derive an equally suitable statement. We 
know that B, qua a non-empty proper subset of E1, belongs to at least one partition* of E1.14 
                                                 
13
 For simplicity, I use the same letters to denote predicates and their corresponding properties and sets. Context 
will determine which one I have in mind. 
14
 Although some partitions* of E1 might not have B as a member, their members’ union will contain all the 
objects that are contained in B. From these we can reconstruct B, e.g. by further partitioning* the members of a 
given partition* and then taking the relevant union of the resulting partitions*. That means that the partition* 
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Take such a partition*, let’s call it ‘C’. C is co-extensional to E1. It contains B as a member 
but also one or more other sets that are disjoint from B. We can assign a property and hence a 
predicate to each of them. Let us call these ‘C1’, … , ‘Cm’, where m is determined by the 
number of disjoint sets in C other than B. The following auxiliary can now be formulated A4: 
(x) (E1x ≡ (Bx v C1x v … v Cmx)). The properties on the right side of the biconditional are 
jointly co-extensional to the property on the left side. If we add A4 to our original set of 
propositions we can derive the following conclusion Ba v C1a … v Cma.15 The observational 
statement Ba can confirm our conclusion without first being transformed into theory-laden 
evidence.16 Q.E.D. 
 
I have just proved what Basu denied. Technicalities aside, the conclusion is supported by a 
very simple logical point. Suppose we are faced with the sort of presumed asymmetry Basu 
talks about, i.e. we have a statement of the form ‘All F’s are G’s’ but we really want a 
statement of the form ‘All G’s are F’s’ or at least some statement that allows us to go from 
G’s to F’s. If we know that all objects with property F have property G, we can infer that 
either some objects with property G have property F or all of them do. The latter case plays 
straight into our hands. The former needs a little spelling out. That’s where the partition* 
notion comes in, as it facilitates the spelling out by letting us decompose properties like G into 
F and non-F parts. Doing so allows us to conclude that an object with property G will also 
                                                                                                                                                        
choice does not really matter for the purposes of inferring something about B from E1. Choosing a partition* that 
includes B as a member just makes the point easier to communicate. 
15
 The complex proposition Ba v C1a … v Cma need not be thoroughly observational, but at least one of its 
atomic components, i.e. Ba, will be. 
16
 I say ‘can confirm’ instead of ‘confirms’ to avoid a controversial issue in confirmation theory, i.e. whether or 
not derived observational statements always have confirmational power. The received view has been that they do 
always have such power but Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin (1991), amongst others, have challenged this view. 
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possess a property from a finite selection of mutually disjoint properties (partitioned* from G) 
that includes F. Thus finding an object with property F can confirm a theory which predicts 
the existence of objects with property G. To put things in perspective, suppose ‘G’ is an 
unobservable property and ‘F’ an observable one. Theories supplemented with the auxiliary 
‘All F’s are G’s’ can be confirmed by observational reports of objects possessing property F. 
 
It is worth noting that auxiliaries A3 and A4 are not merely stipulated but derived from 
existing auxiliaries, in this case A1. We can similarly derive auxiliaries A5, (x) (Bx ≡ E2x), 
and A6, (x) (E2x ≡ (Bx v D1x v … v Dkx)), from A2 to allow Priestly’s theory to be directly 
tested by observations. Indeed, with the help of A5 and A6, Priestly’s theory can be confirmed 
by Ba. Since Ba can confirm both theories it cannot be used to discriminate between them. 
This problem is of no concern to us here since we are frying an altogether different fish. The 
aim was to show that theories plus suitable auxiliaries can be directly tested via observations, 
i.e. it was not to show that the presence of black powder discriminates between Lavoisier’s 
and Priestly’s theories. At any rate, in terms of theory testing we are not worse off than when 
we started since E1 and E2 are also unable to discriminate between the two theories. 
Moreover, the fact that one observation report cannot adjudicate between two theories (plus 
associated auxiliaries) does not entail that (1) it cannot adjudicate between those theories and 
others and (2) all observation reports are similarly impotent.17 In the historical case at hand, 
the observation that some substances gained weight during combustion worked in favour of 
the oxygen theory by disconfirming the phlogiston theory as it was traditionally construed. 
Spurred on by this observation some phlogiston theorists supplanted the central view that 
                                                 
17
 It is still an open question whether for any given theory there is at least one other theory that no observation 
report can adjudicate between. This takes us into underdetermination territory. As it is customarily understood, 
the underdetermination thesis presupposes, contra Basu, that derived observation sentences have confirmational 
power but of course only towards the empirical models of the theory. 
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phlogiston was weightless with the view that it had negative weight. The manoeuvre did not 
ultimately save the phlogiston theory, but it certainly illustrates the fact that an observation 
report can adjudicate between two theories, in our case the oxygen theory vs. the traditionally 
construed phlogiston theory. 
 
In a sense what I have argued for is unsurprising. An auxiliary of the form ‘evidence x implies 
observation y’ or something weaker like ‘evidence x implies a disjunction one of whose 
disjuncts is an observation y’ is implicit in the scientists’ thoughts when they employ an 
inverse conditional, i.e. when they infer from their observations some evidential report. 
Indeed, on pain of inconsistency, the scientists must have a biconditional or even an identity 
relation in mind. They take it that one of the manifestations of iron oxide (or iron calx) is 
black powder, hence they are in effect accepting a statement like ‘An object is iron oxide (or 
iron calx) iff/= it is black powder with certain observable properties or it is a red-brownish 
solid with certain observable properties or …’.18 This implicit acceptance puts paid to the 
view that theories do not entail, predict or even potentially explain observation statements. In 
any case, as I have shown above, the explicit acceptance of the original auxiliaries is 
sufficient to establish direct contact between theories and observation reports. 
 
A final qualification is in order. It should be obvious that by ‘direct contact’ I do not mean 
anything that violates Duhem’s thesis that theories can never be tested in isolation. Rather, I 
mean that theories plus suitable theoretical auxiliaries can entail, predict and potentially 
explain observation statements or data. In short, the view developed in this paper is perfectly 
compatible with various forms of holism.19 
 
                                                 
18
 Not all of the disjuncts need be observational. 
19
 In my view, some form of partial holism is highly plausible. 
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3. Conclusion 
It has not been argued here that theories always make direct contact with the observational 
ground. Instead, it has been argued that cases like the Lavoisier-Priestly controversy, i.e. cases 
where an auxiliary of the form ‘observation y implies evidence x’ is already present, do make 
contact. Whether all theories share this feature is itself a broadly empirical matter. I for one 
am inclined to think that at least in the majority of cases we can find suitable theoretical 
auxiliaries which together with their respective theories entail, predict and potentially explain 
the observational data. 
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